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This paper analyzes the effectiveness of foreign assistance pursuant to national security 
objectives.  Counter narcotics initiatives in Colombia are utilized in a case-study 
approach that conducts an analysis of the different components of foreign assistance that 
were designed to curb the flow of illicit narcotics into the United States.  The focus for 
this study involved the estimated coca cultivation quantities from the 32 different 
departments in Colombia. The application of assistance applied toward eradication, 
interdiction, and alternative development programs are delineated in their efficacy toward 
achieving the desired end state.  Additional analysis is made for six of the top coca-
cultivating departments in Colombia.  Economic factors are also considered as a 
contributing factor in the overall coca cultivating reduction within Colombia from 2000 
to 2011.  The intent of this study is to determine whether foreign assistance is an effective 
tool for achieving security objectives in counter drug policy.  Additionally, this thesis 
aims to provide insight into which components of foreign assistance are more effective at 
achieving overall illicit crop reductions.  Furthermore, this thesis intends to provide 
recommendations for the future application of foreign assistance pursuant to counter 
narcotics policy.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The United States pursues several methods of promoting national security.  The 
most publicized method involves direct U.S. intervention, as pursued in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  Today, the government is returning to a more indirect approach following a decade 
of direct involvement in two wars in which the U.S. experienced mixed results.  A second 
method of promoting national security that is frequently utilized is the hardening of U.S. 
targets.  Stricter travel laws, border control, personnel searches, and increased security 
are all aspects of this method.  While shown to be an effective method of reducing 
security threats, this method does nothing to disrupt security threats at the source or 
“venue” states abroad.1  The third and most broadly employed method of combating 
transnational threats uses the United States’ influence and foreign assistance to enhance 
other nations’ efforts.  Foreign assistance and its effects on transnational threats within a 
recipient nation is the least understood of the three methods as it has traditionally been 
difficult to measure the success of the many programs the U.S. has undertaken.  The 
history of U.S. foreign policy is dotted with successes and failures in the application of 
foreign assistance when pursuing national security objectives. 
Following the devastation of World War II (WWII), European economies were in 
a state of complete disrepair.  Understanding the importance of a healthy European 
economy, both to deter the spread of communism and alleviate widespread poverty, the 
United States embarked on a grand design to accelerate the European economy’s 
recovery.  The proposal to Congress was named the Marshall Plan, after then Secretary of 
State George C. Marshall.2  The plan, as an extension of the communism containment 
strategy of the Truman Doctrine, would provide food, fuel, machinery, and other staples 
to rebuild transportation, agricultural, and industrial capabilities in Europe.  President 
Harry Truman believed that such provisions would support “economic stability and 
                                                 
1 Konstantinos Drakos and Andreas Gofas, “In Search of the Average Transnational Terrorist Attack 
Venue,” Defence and Peace Economics 17, 2 (2006): 73. 
2 As presented to Congress, the Marshall Plan was originally titled the European Recovery Program 
 2 
orderly political processes opposing the spread of chaos and extremism, preventing 
advancement of Communist influence and use of armed minorities, and orienting other 
foreign nations toward the U.S. and the U.N.”3  Scholars generally agree that the 
Marshall Plan succeeded by “eradicating the social and political and economic conditions 
on which Communism thrives.”4  The Marshall Plan administered approximately 
$13 billion in aid between 1949 and 1951 to sixteen European nations.  It succeeded in 
bolstering Western Europe’s economy as it realized a 40% industrial production increase 
beyond pre-war levels.5  Additionally, communist influence in France and Italy were 
reduced while communist incursions in Greece and Turkey were deterred as security aid 
was successfully prioritized for those nations.6  As the Marshall Plan concluded it 
morphed into the Mutual Security Act, which continued similar communism containment 
objectives through economic assistance.  The Mutual Security Act eventually transitioned 
to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under the Kennedy 
Administration.   
While the Marshall Plan is widely viewed as a foreign assistance success story 
within the realm of anticommunism foreign policy, a similar effort was made in South 
America with significantly poorer results.  In 1961, President John F. Kennedy initiated 
the Alliance for Progress.  Its charter enumerated 94 goals that would “achieve a real 
economic growth rate of at least 2.5 percent per capita (GNP) per year for participating 
Latin American nations.7  Ancillary objectives involving improvements in education, 
employment, health, trade diversification, and government reform were to be completed 
by 1970.  Similar to the Marshall Plan, Kennedy’s aim was to diminish the economic and 
social conditions that would allow communism to take hold in Latin America.  He 
                                                 
3 William C. Cromwell, “The Marshall Non-Plan, Congress and the Soviet Union,” Western Political 
Quarterly32, no. 4 (1979): 425.  
4 Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped 
Save Europe (New York: Free Press, 2007), 328. 
5 A.E. Jeffcoat, “Dollars for Europe,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 1951, 1. 
6 Greece and Turkey received more than $500 million in security aid and military equipment between 
1949 and 1951. 
7 Stephen C. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World—John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist 
Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 148. 
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strongly believed that “the transformation of Latin America would justify U.S. global 
leadership and demonstrate the nation’s ability to accomplish enlightened, anti-
Communist policies.”8  The Alliance for Progress administered $22.3 billion between 
1961 and 1973 to 19 South American countries.9  Between 1961 and 1967 recipient 
nations experienced no significant gains in per capita economic growth.  1968 marked the 
first year per capita growth exceeded 2.5%.10  Unemployment increased from 18 million 
in 1961 to 25 million in 1970.  While agricultural output increased, it failed to adequately 
address the growing population.  Similarly, health, education, income inequality 
reduction, and standard of living goals were not met.11  Additionally, government reform 
goals were thwarted by “six military coups that overthrew elected governments in 
Argentina, Peru, Guatemala, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras.”12  The 
U.S. government’s willingness to continue assistance to dictatorial governments led many 
South American nations to openly doubt the validity of Alliance for Progress’s 
commitment to social reform and democracy.  Although it was intended to counter the 
Cuban Revolution, scholars generally agree that the Alliance for Progress contributed to a 
less stable Latin America by failing to meet its lofty expectation and tacitly supporting 
military coups that ousted elected governments.13  Foreign assistance continued to be 
used primarily as a communism containment strategy, with resources provided to Latin 
American and African nations for that purpose, until the early 1990s when the Soviet 
Union collapsed. 
The United States has used foreign assistance to advance similar international 
security objectives in the last decade.  Recent programs rely more heavily on security 
assistance, although economic assistance is still a large component.  Both the 2006 and 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 152. 
10 Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1970), 8. 
11 Ibid., 10. 
12 Thomas C. Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution (Westport: Praeger 
Publishers, 2001), 69. 
13 Ibid., 68–69. 
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2010 National Security Strategies label failed states and weak states as global hazards in 
a deeply interconnected world.  In such states, governments are unable or unwilling to 
deter the activities of transnational actors.  The Clinton, G. W. Bush , and Obama 
administrations have attempted to use economic and security assistance to encourage 
recipient governments to actively combat drug trafficking and other transnational threats.  
Foreign assistance that improves weak states’ economic and security shortfalls is 
believed to be mutually beneficial to the recipient nation and the United States.  Military 
partnerships and economic and security assistance are combined to form a comprehensive 
security strategy that “requires both more effort to build appropriate civilian capacity and 
better preparation of military forces to fill gaps that will inevitably appear by conducting 
or participating in political, social, information, and economic programs.”14   
In the last twenty years, terrorism and narco-trafficking are the two transnational 
threats that have received the most foreign assistance funding.  While the results from 
counterterror initiatives are not yet clear, counter narcotics programs have yielded a 
wealth of data to allow for the analysis of specific foreign assistance programs.  
Frequently referred to as non-lethal targeting by the military, the employment of 
USAID and the use of military forces and government agencies to enhance civil capacity 
when directed toward major drug producing nations and regions has been included as a 
significant aspect of the U.S. National Security Strategy over the last two decades.15  The 
2012 National Drug Control Strategy identifies transnational criminal organizations that 
import illicit drugs to the U.S. as a “persistent and dangerous threat to public health and 
safety.”16  It further states that international drug control measures are required to curb 
the amount of illicit narcotics brought into the U.S.  Pursuing cooperative counter 
narcotic initiatives in countries such as Mexico and Colombia are envisioned as a way 
                                                 
14 Richard A. Lacquement Jr., “Integrating Civilian and Military Activities.” Parameters 40, no. 1 
(2010): 10.  
15 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: White House, 
1993), 18-19; White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: White 
House, 1997), 4; White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2002), 10; White House, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America (Washington, DC: White House, 2006), 48; White House, National Security Strategy 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 42–43. 
16 White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2012), 25.  
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toward “reducing the supply of illicit drugs in the United States while assisting nations 
that are adversely affected by the illicit drug trade.”17  The planned method of execution 
involves security agreements with international partners that are plagued with significant 
illicit crop cultivation and drug production.  President Obama’s plan incorporates 
security, economic, and governmental reforms within venue states that are “ultimately 
designed to reduce drug production and trafficking, promote alternative livelihoods, and 
strengthen rule of law, democratic institutions, citizen security, and respect for human 
rights.”18 
Though not as grand in scale as the Marshall Plan, several large interagency 
projects have been undertaken by the U.S. government in the last decade.  Mostly skewed 
toward security assistance, modern projects include a mix of both security and economic 
assistance.  Plan Colombia was initiated by the Clinton administration to assist the 
Colombian government with counter-narcotics, governing capacity, and economic 
development with the expressed intent of reducing drug trafficking into the U.S.19  An 
assessment of the effectiveness of this program can provide insight into the strategic 
efficaciousness of foreign aid as a national security tool.  How, if at all, has this initiative 
contributed to national security and a reduction in narcotic trafficking? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
National security has been strongly linked to foreign aid since the onset of the 
Cold War.  Economic and security assistance were historically administered with anti-
communism objectives in mind.  In the 1980s and ’90s the war on drugs supplanted the 
dwindling communist threat.  The focus of foreign assistance shifted again after 
September 11, 2001, when counter-terrorism became the chief security concern.  Through 
all the shifting priorities the strategy for applying assistance has remained largely the 
same without any real analysis of whether the old strategy fits the new threat 
environment.  In the fiscally strained economy of the U.S. today, annual foreign 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 31.  
18 Ibid. 
19 “United States Support for Colombia,” March 28, 2000, 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html  
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assistance outlays of more than $35 billion (of which $10.3 billion is devoted specifically 
for peace and security) receives significant scrutiny and its effectiveness is often 
questioned.   It is important that policy makers understand the impacts of foreign 
assistance pursuant to national security goals in order to determine whether such 
programs should receive further funding and if similar programs should be enacted 
elsewhere. Additionally, it is important to understand the settings in which the economic 
and developmental components of foreign assistance are more likely to yield the desired 
results than the security focused components.  This thesis contributes to advancing such 
understanding. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The argument presented in this thesis is that economic assistance is more effective 
at reducing drug trafficking than security assistance.  This argument similarly stems from 
motivations.  Drug crop cultivators are seeking financial security.  Scholarly studies 
indicate that providing equitable alternatives sources of income to illicit crop farmers will 
reduce the amount of coca being cultivated.20 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Evaluating the success of foreign assistance programs has been a challenge for 
U.S. policy makers since the initiation of the Marshall Plan.  The government and 
scholars alike have found it difficult to identify a causal relationship between aid and 
security objectives.  There is a debate in the literature on the impact of foreign assistance 
as a tool for national security to date.  One school of thought argues for significant 
positive effects, while another argues that impacts have been largely irrelevant and 
oftentimes negative.  Several books and scholarly journal articles assert that U.S. 
economic and military aid programs help legitimize a weak state, further enabling the 
 
                                                 
20 Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 
76, no. 2 (March 1968): 169–217. 
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government to project power to the rural areas of their country.  Authors of these works 
similarly claim that sustainable developmental assistance can promote U.S. strategic 
interests abroad.21 
The basis of their argument lies in economic reasoning.  When foreign 
governments fail or cannot provide basic services (rule of law, education, health care, 
etc.) their citizens are “likely to experience steeply escalating problems that spill over to 
the rest of the world, including the United States.”22  If the assistance is used effectively 
and prevents the disintegration of state institutions and governance, it will lead to greater 
power projection within a nation’s borders.  Greater power projection will allow the 
governments to prevent criminal organizations from using their country as a narcotics 
production factory. Additionally, economic benefits seek to dissuade would-be illicit crop 
farmers.  Young men (a primary recruiting pool of criminal organizations and guerilla 
groups) are less likely to become disillusioned and engage in criminal activity if 
economic prospects exist within their community.  Ultimately, a country that improves 
upon its civil liberty, economic, and security shortfalls is less likely to fall prey to 
violence from its own people, as well.23 Unfortunately, while there are several articles 
extolling the importance of foreign assistance, few articles attempt to evaluate its impact 
using empirical evidence.24  Of the few articles that do utilize empirical evidence, there is 
polarization among opinions regarding the effectiveness of foreign assistance as a tool to 
pursue strategic security objectives. 
The use of aid to assist recipient nations with the eradication of drug crops has 
been a constant foreign policy practice since the Nixon administration. Very few 
                                                 
21 Daniel Byman, The Five Front War (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 194–195; Tom H. 
Hastings, Nonviolent Response to Terrorism (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2004), 4; Patrick M. 
Cronin, “Foreign Aid,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin et 
al. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 248–249. 
22 Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Strategic Significance of Global Inequality,” Washington Quarterly 24, no. 3 
(2001): 187–198.  
23 Royal C. Gardner, International Assistance, Sustainable Development, and the War on Terrorism 
(Washington, D.C.: Environmental Law Institute, 2002) 8; Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen. “The 
Roles of Foreign Aid and Education in the War on Terror.” Public Choice 135, no. 3-4 (2008): 375–397.  
24 Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy, and Alison Sherley. “Are Counter-Terrorism Strategies 
Effective? the Results of the Campbell Systematic Review on Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Research.” 
Journal of Experimental Criminology 2, no. 4 (2006): 508–512. 
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empirical studies address the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing drug trafficking.  
Due to the covert nature of narcotics transactions, scholars are limited to estimations 
based on coca, poppy, and cannabis cultivation quantities.  
The concept of utilizing foreign assistance to curb illicit crop cultivation is 
heavily influenced by a widely cited 1968 study by Gary S. Becker titled “Crime and 
Punishment—An Economic Approach.”  Becker’s findings support the belief that a cost-
benefit analysis heavily influences why many people choose to commit crimes.25  
A person commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the 
utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other 
activities. Some persons become "criminals," therefore, not because their 
basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their 
benefits and costs differ.26   
Providing a legitimate alternative means of employment can therefore reduce the 
probability that a person will choose to commit a crime.27  For a South American farmer 
with no access to legitimate agricultural markets, the choice to plant illicit crops is an 
easy one.  A strong demand for illicit crops, a severely limited government presence, and 
scarce opportunities to make equivalent legal revenue all contribute to a farmer’s decision 
to choose the criminal route to making money.  If a government can minimize these 
barriers to legitimate employment than the likelihood that farmers will choose the illegal 
route is significantly diminished. 
In 1998, Graham Farrell published “A Global Empirical Review of Drug Crop 
Eradication and United Nations Crop Substitution and Alternative Development 
Strategies.”  His article analyzed the effectiveness of crop substitution and illicit crop 
eradication in 11 different countries from 1970 through 1990.  Eradication refers to the 
manual uprooting or fumigation of unwanted crops.  Alternative 
development/substitution involves the replacement of illicit crops with legitimate ones.  
Through a multiyear comparison of the net income per hectare of alternative crops versus 
                                                 
25 According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, a cost-benefit analysis is determined by dividing the 
projected benefits of a program [decision] by the projected costs. 
26 Becker, “Crime and Punishment,” 176. 
27 Ibid., 177. 
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illicit crops (coca, poppy, and cannabis) Farrell demonstrated that alternative substitution 
was a viable option when government funding assisted the farmers in establishing new 
crops.  His findings point to higher levels of crop substitution success when the 
government assists with the significant costs associated with upgrading to a legitimate 
agricultural product.  Typically, improved infrastructure (roads, irrigation), seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides, and hired labor were provided to ease the transition.  The less 
successful countries failed to assist their farmers with the switch to a legitimate source of 
income.  Paul T. Cohen and Joseph L. Zentner conducted similar data analysis with 
analogous results.28  
Using data from 2001 to 2005, Michelle Dion and Katherine Russler conducted a 
five-year study of fumigation efforts in Colombia.  Contrary to Farrell’s findings, they 
concluded that fumigation does not reduce the amount of illicit crops being cultivated.  
Instead it succeeds in displacing coca farmers and coca plots to more remote locations 
that are smaller and less prone to government interference.29  Additionally, they found 
that the extensive fumigation efforts did little to impact the market price and subsequent 
demand for cocaine.   
In a 2006 study, Stella M. Rouse and Moises Arce analyzed the effects of U.S. 
counter narcotic policy on coca cultivation in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia.  Using data 
from 1980 to 2001, they performed a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis while 
controlling for exogenous variables.  U.S. security assistance was the independent 
variable under investigation and coca cultivation (measured in hectares) was the 
dependent variable.  The data indicated that coca cultivation decreased in Peru and 
Bolivia, but not in Colombia when security assistance was provided.  They concluded 
that narco-terror groups such as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were 
                                                 
28 Paul T. Cohen, “The Post-Opium Scenario and Rubber in Northern Laos: Alternative Western and 
Chinese Models of Development,” International Journal of Drug Policy 20, no. 5 (2009): 424–430; Joseph 
L. Zentner, “The 1972 Turkish Opium Ban: Needle in the Haystack Diplomacy? [Efforts to Curtail 
Production; Effects on the Illicit Drug Market; Effects on the Turkish Economy; Efforts to Aid Poppy 
Farmers Affected by the Ban],” World Affairs 136, (1973): 36–47. 
29 Michelle, L. Dion and Catherine Russler, “Eradication Efforts, the State, Displacement and Poverty: 
Explaining Coca Cultivation in Colombia during Plan Colombia.” Journal of Latin American Studies 40, 
no. 3 (2008): 399–421. 
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instrumental in maintaining coca cultivation numbers in Colombia during the years 
studied.  No such narco-terror groups existed in Peru or Bolivia.30  Thus, Rouse and 
Arce suggest that additional security assistance is needed to counter the terrorism threat 
that coincides with drug trafficking in Colombia.   
An article titled “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism” by Bruce 
Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw similarly argues for the inclusion of a strong 
governmental security component when addressing the challenges of a terrorist/insurgent 
population.  Hoffman and Taw support the inclusion of a strong government security lead 
when addressing the insurgent population that funds and supports the illicit crop 
cultivation.  The absence of a consistent government presence or policy toward the narco 
trafficking organizations and illicit crop farmers will result in an alienated citizenry and a 
failed government counternarcotic response that allows the narco-traffickers to “exploit 
the situation to entrench themselves firmly within the population.”31  
Prior to 2006, it was commonly held that policy designed to restrict the supply of 
drugs would “shift the supply curve up and to the left, increasing the market price and 
reducing the quantity of drugs sold in the market.”32 Contrary to this belief, the study 
conducted by Caulkins et al. found that restrictive policies that thin the pool of violent 
dealers will decrease the likeliness of violence (among dealers), thereby lowering their 
operating costs.  Savings are then passed to the consumer.33  If correct, this theory would 
undermine any efforts by the U.S. to pursue security measures as a method of curbing the 
flow of narcotics into the country. 
                                                 
30 Stella M. Rouse and Moises Arce, “The Drug-Laden Balloon: U.S. Military Assistance and Coca 
Production in the Central Andes*,” Social Science Quarterly 87, no. 3 (2006): 555–556. 
31 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism,” in 
European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, 
ed. Fernando Reinares (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2000), 20. 
32 Peter Reuter, and Mark Kleiman, “Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of Drug Enforcement,” 
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 7, (1986): 289–291.  
33 Caulkins, Jonathan P., Peter Reuter, and Lowell J. Taylor. “Can Supply Restrictions Lower Price? 
Violence, Drug Dealing and Positional Advantage.” B.E.Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: 
Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy 5, no. 1 (2006): 1. 
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Based on these quantitative studies, scholars agree that foreign assistance is 
effective at reducing drug trafficking but disagree on the method of employment.  More 
in-depth process-tracing case studies are needed to address the debate about causal 
pathways. Thus, this thesis will enhance the understanding of foreign aid’s impact on 
drug trafficking by addressing the debate about what types of aid (security or economic) 
are most effective and why, using a case study approach. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Colombia was selected for study because it has been the beneficiary of large 
amounts of U.S. foreign aid for the past decade, and has involved a large range of types 
of assistance.  Colombia has been one of the top annual recipients of U.S. aid since Plan 
Colombia was initiated in 2000.  Between 2000 and 2007, Colombia received 
approximately $6.2 billion to support Plan Colombia and its initiatives that include: 
ending the long armed conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC); elimination of drug 
trafficking; and the promotion of economic and social development.34 Through economic 
and social development the Clinton administration sought to increase the rule of law, 
protect human rights, expand economic development, and institute judicial reform in 
order to eliminate the trafficking of drugs to the U.S.35 
Data is taken from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports, Congressional Research Service reports, 
USAID, the World Bank, and Pew research reports to examine the impacts of foreign 
assistance on drug trafficking in Colombia. 
                                                 
34 In addition to being labeled as terrorist organizations, in 2003, the FARC and AUC were designated 
Significant Foreign Narcotics Traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106–
120). 
35 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully 
Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance (2008), 
28, 47. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis analyzes the results of foreign assistance when applied to Colombia.  
Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative are discussed in Chapter II 
pursuant to counter-narcotic efforts and foreign assistance projects from 2000 to 2011.  
Chapter III summarizes the findings, correlates results with historical literature, and 
provides recommendations on how to improve upon current foreign assistance counter-
narcotic policy. 
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II. COUNTERNARCOTICS ASSISTANCE IN COLOMBIA 
A. BACKGROUND 
This chapter will examine the effectiveness of the different components of foreign 
aid in reducing the amount of cultivated coca in Colombia from 2001 to 2011.   Unlike 
nearby Peru and Bolivia, which permit the legal cultivation of limited amounts of coca, 
the Colombian government prohibits coca cultivation entirely.  Beginning in the 1970s, 
the Colombian government devoted significant manpower and resources toward the 
eradication of coca and poppy plants.  Colombia’s Direccion Nacional de Estupefacientes 
(DNE) spearheaded drug control legislation for the country and developed an approach 
that incorporated “the control of production of coca and poppy; the control of the 
processing, purification, and transport of the cocaine and heroin; and the seizure and 
forfeiture of the profits of illicit drug production.”36   Colombia’s drug control policy is 
neatly aligned with U.S. counternarcotic strategy, save for its exclusion of advancing 
human rights.   
U.S. international narcotics control policy in the early 2000s was focused on 
reducing “the supply of illicit narcotics flows into the United States,” with a secondary 
aim of reducing “the amount of illicit narcotics cultivated, processed, and consumed 
worldwide.”37  Prior to Plan Colombia, the U.S. engaged in a large scale coca eradication 
campaign in Peru and Bolivia.  Eradication efforts from 1995 to 2001 successfully 
eliminated approximately 110,000 hectares of coca, which equated to 70% of the 
cultivated portions of those countries.38  During the same period, coca cultivation in 
Colombia increased by 119,000 hectares (Figure 1).  This shift led to major conflicts 
between well-funded cartels, leftist guerillas, and Colombian law enforcement. In the late 
                                                 
36 Organization of American States, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, 
“Environmental and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray Program for Coca and Poppy Control 
in Colombia,” a report prepared for the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) section 
of the OAS, March 31, 2005, 17. 
37U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Drug Control: International Policy and 
Approaches, by Raphael Perl, CRS Report IB88093 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, February 2, 2006), 5. 
38 Ibid., 6. 
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1990s, leftist guerilla groups began heavily taxing the revenue from coca production.  
This new revenue stream allowed the FARC to expand its control throughout the 
southeastern portion of the country, eventually controlling more than 40% of Colombia.39 
 
Figure 1.  Coca Cultivated in Colombia from 1994 to 2001 
In response to the coca shift into Colombia, U.S. policy makers adopted a new 
strategy for combating illicit drug trafficking.  Working closely with former Colombian 
President Andrés Pastrana, the U.S. government pledged $2.8 billion for economic 
assistance and $1.7 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Department of 
Defense assistance for the execution of Plan Colombia.40  Security assistance for 
interdiction and eradication would be complimented by economic assistance for creating 
alternative cultivation and employment opportunities in Plan Colombia.  Plan Colombia 
adopted a three-pronged approach to curbing cocaine trafficking from Colombia to the 
United States.  The State Department (DoS) assisted the Colombian government with 
crop eradication activities, the United States Agency for International Development 
                                                 
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Challenges in Implementing Plan Colombia, (2000), 1. 
40 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Plan Colombia—A Progress Report, by 
Connie Veillette, CRS Report RL32774 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 


















(USAID) promoted alternative development paired with governmental reforms, and the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) partnered with Colombian counternarcotic officials 
and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) specialists to disrupt trafficking organizations 
and interdict coca shipments.41 
Although the U.S. did not meet its initial goal of reducing coca cultivation by 
50%, Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative have drastically reduced 
cultivations numbers from the 1999 to 2001 period, when they were at their all-time high.  
Figure 2 shows the reduction from 2000 to 2011, with UNODC recording the annual coca 
cultivation numbers remaining relatively flat after 2004.  Of note, the coca cultivation 
area in 2011 is 60% less than the 163,000 hectares cultivated in 2000.  The difficulty for 
policy makers lies in determining the primary causes of the reduction.  Funding for Plan 
Colombia and the ongoing Andean Counterdrug Initiative was split between eradication, 
interdiction, and alternative development activities.  These factors will be analyzed 
individually and within the Colombian departments that experienced the most drastic 
shifts in coca cultivation.  
 
Figure 2.  Coca Cultivated in Colombia since Plan Colombia 
 and the ACI Were Initiated. 
                                                 
41 United States Government Accountability Office, Counter Narcotics Assistance (2012), 2. 
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Data for this case study were primarily derived from multi-year United Nations 
Office of Drug Control (UNODC) Colombia Coca Cultivation Surveys.  Analysis of the 
data entailed the comparison of eradication, alternative development, and security 
strategies conducted within the different departments of Colombia.  The fluctuations in 
coffee and palm oil prices are also considered as an economic contributor to Plan 
Colombia’s results.  Although the oil and mining industry represents approximately 30% 
of the Colombian export market, it is not considered a significant contributor to 
employment due to its relatively low employment requirements.42   
Colombian coca farmers harvest between two and seven times per year.  Coastal 
areas experience fewer yields while higher elevations record the highest number of 
harvests.  The national average yield for a coca plantation is 4.5 times per year or once 
every 81 days.  Annual coca leaf yields (in terms of kilograms per hectare per year) range 
from 2,600 to 7,100.  The national average yield is 4,200 kg/ha/yr.43  Prior to becoming 
the cocaine powder that is sold illicitly throughout the world; coca leaves must undergo 
several chemical processes.  Coca leaves are converted into a paste, then a base, and 
finally into cocaine hydrochloride.  The 2012 UNODC Colombia Coca Cultivation 
Survey indicates that approximately 1.64 kg of cocaine hydrochloride can be derived 
from one metric ton (mt) of coca leaf.  This means that the average hectare of coca plants 







                                                 
42 The combined employment of all Colombian industry, to include oil, textiles, mining, and 
chemicals, represents only 13% of the labor force; compared to 18% from agriculture alone; CIA World 
Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html.  
43 United Nations Office of Drug Control, 2012 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 42-43. 
44 Ibid., 44-45. 
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ACI Funding Interdiction/Security Funding 
 
 
Eradication Alt Dev FMF IMET NADR DoD Total 
FY2000 686.40 208.00 — 0.90 — 229.20 1124.50 
FY2001 48.00 — — 1.00 — 190.20 239.20 
FY2002 243.50 136.40 — 1.20 25.00 119.10 525.20 
FY2003 412.00 168.20 17.10 1.20 3.30 165.00 766.80 
FY2004 324.60 159.30 98.50 1.70 0.20 122.00 706.30 
FY2005 310.70 152.10 99.20 1.70 5.10 200.00 767.80 
FY2006 307.70 157.00 89.10 1.67 5.48 122.00 682.95 
FY2007 298.93 166.07 85.50 1.61 3.96 na 556.07 
Total 2,631.83 1,147.07 389.40 10.98 43.04 1,147.50 5,368.82 
Table 1. U.S. Funding for Colombia (Millions of USD)45 
B. ERADICATION 
Eradication is the largest, most costly component of Plan Colombia (Table 1).  All 
eradication efforts are managed and funded by the State Department’s Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the Narcotics Affairs 
Section (NAS) of the U.S. Embassy in Colombia.46  Eradication efforts in Colombia are 
performed manually and aerially.  Manual eradication simply involves uprooting and 
destroying coca plants by hand.  Manual eradication is heavily subsidized by U.S. State 
Department funding but executed by Mobile Eradication Groups (GME) and the 
DIRAN.47  Aerial eradication, often called fumigation, involves low-flying airplanes 
spraying coca and poppy fields with herbicide.  The chemicals destroy the coca leaves, 
but the root structures remain intact, allowing farmers who prune shortly after a spraying 
to recommence cultivating activities within six months. Aerial eradication was fully 
funded by the State Department, and missions were executed by State Department 
contractors.  All aircraft, maintenance, fuel, and herbicide were also provided by the State 
                                                 
45 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Andean Counterdrug Initiative and 
Related Funding Programs: FY2006 Assistance, by Connie Veillette, CRS Report RL33253 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, January 27, 2006), 6, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/60720.pdf. 
46 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative 
Development in the Andes, by  Connie Veillette and Carolina Navarrete-Frias, CRS Report RL33163 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, November. 18, 2005), 3–4; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office,  Counter Narcotics Assistance, (2012), 29. 
47 United Nations Office of Drug Control, 2009 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 73. 
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Department.  The practice of manually uprooting coca plants dates back several decades 
and was greatly expanded as a component of Plan Colombia.  Although more time 
consuming and requiring considerably more man-power, manual eradication is seen as a 
superior method of eradication to fumigation because plants are completely destroyed 
forcing farmers to replant and wait up to eight months for their first yield.  Both manual 
and aerial eradication were utilized prior to 2000, and were greatly expanded with 
increased U.S. funding.  Colombia experienced its all-time high of 163,000 hectares of 
coca cultivated in 2000.  Table 2 illustrates the drastic increase in eradiation activities 
beginning shortly after Plan Colombia’s funding commenced.  It is important to note that 
the area of aerial eradication is often greater than the area of overall coca cultivation 
(when compared to Figure 1) because many areas are fumigated on numerous occasions 
during a twelve-month period.  Table 2 demonstrates a significant decrease in eradication 
following 2007’s record highs.  A 31% decrease in funding for the State Department’s 
eradication efforts in Colombia explains the decrease in aerial eradication volume in 
2008.  Subsequent years experienced more steady declines in funding that impacted both 
manual and aerial eradication activities.48  
 
                                                 








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Aerial 
Eradication 
58073 94153 130364 132818 136552 138772 172026 153135 133494 104772 101940 130303 
Manual 
Eradication  
1745 2752 4011 2589 29746 43536 66377 95732 59071 43690 34172 














Interdiction represents the second largest funded component of Plan Colombia 
(Table 1) and comprised primarily of training and provisions.  The State Department, in 
partnership with DEA and DoD, trained Colombian national police and military forces in 
tactics for disrupting transnational drug syndicates and illicit drug harvesting terrorist 
organizations.  Interdiction efforts were enhanced by communication and intelligence 
equipment provided by the State Department.  Funding was also earmarked for an 
increased military presence in previously ungoverned areas of Colombia.  Table 3 shows 
how increased interdiction efforts, as a result of Plan Colombia, have produced drastic 
increases in cocaine and cocaine derivative seizures.  Complementary to Table 3, Table 4 
illustrates marked increases in the discovery and subsequent destruction of cocaine 
production laboratories.  Many of the interdiction activities were executed in conjunction 
with large-scale Colombian military operations such as Plan Patriota and Plan 
Consolidación.  Cocaine, coca base, and coca paste are typically interdicted at labs while 
coca leaf is seized from both farmers and production facilities.  To put this data into 
perspective, the 2008 seizure of 198,336kg of cocaine HCl is equivalent to the annual 









Table 3. Cocaine and Cocaine Derivative Seizures 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Cocaine 
HCl(kg) 








897,911 583,165 638,000 688,691 567,638 682,010 818,544 1,064,503 644,353 826,793 871,249 1,022,532 
Coca 
 Paste  
(kg) 


















































Table 4. Cocaine Producing Laboratories Destroyed 
 
D. ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
Providing alternate sources of income for former coca farmers was seen as an 
essential component of Plan Colombia and for the long-term success of illicit crop 
reduction. Alternative development programs are spearheaded by USAID but executed in 
cooperation with Colombian government agencies, as well as several non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).  Colombia is divided into 33 administrative departments (regions).  
USAID developed economic programs specific to each region based upon climate and 
geography.  The majority of economic programs were not put into place until 2002.  
Annual funding for Plan Colombia’s alternative development programs are listed in 
Table 1.  Data in Table 1 illustrates that security focused eradication and interdiction 
programs received more than double the funding provided to alternative development 
initiatives. 
Large swaths of Colombia’s countryside are devoid of economic infrastructure.  
Several structural factors limit farmers’ ability to grow legitimate crops including “lack 
of access to land, lack of titles to land, irrigation, roads, credit, technical assistance, and 
established markets.”49 Cartels and leftist guerilla groups flourish in the ungoverned 
areas of the country and are willing to support coca farmers who have no access to the 
structural factors listed above.  The three main programs developed to address these 
shortfalls are Areas for Municipal-Level Alternative Development (ADAM), the 
Additional Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS), and the 
Acción Social program.  ADAM was implemented in 2005 to reduce illicit crop 
cultivation through the implementation of sustainable, market-driven, and legitimate 
                                                 
49 USAID, Assessment of The Implementation of The United States Government’s Support for Plan 
Colombia’s Illicit Crop Reduction Components, Vanda Felbab-Brown et al., Apr 17, 2009, 7. 
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alternative crop production.50  Also initiated in 2005, MIDAS was created to foster 
entrepreneurialship and legitimate job creation through education and economic reforms.  
The Acción Social program has many components; the most funded being the Family 
Forest Warden (Familias Guardabosques) Program.  The Family Forest Warden Program 
(FFWP), created in 2003 to assist families with the abandoning of illicit crops.  
Participant communities are obligated to eradicate illicit cultivations, not sow or re-sow 
illicit cultivations, and not carrying out any task related to illegal cultivation 
whatsoever.51  In exchange, the Government of Colombia (GOC) provides bi-monthly 
payments of 408,000 Colombian Pesos (USD$190) to each family for an 18-month 
period.  The money was designed to cover the loss of revenue from coca and poppy sales 
until legitimate crops could produce revenue. 
Both ADAM and the Family Forest Warden program are essentially contracts 
with farmers.  If the farmer agrees to cease farming illicit crops and demonstrates that all 
his land is free of coca and poppy, he will be eligible for technical support, marketing 
assistance, surrounding infrastructure improvements, and seed money to promote the 
cultivation of licit crops.  Additionally, the GOC agreed to subsidize the farmer’s 
revenues until the farmer could reap the benefits of the newly planted legitimate crops.52  
A 2006 State Department report to Congress indicated that “80,000 rural families have 
benefited from USAID-funded alternative livelihoods projects, generating 53,000 
legitimate jobs and more than 100,000 hectares of legitimate crops.”53  A 2010 audit of 
the alternative development programs in Colombia offered contradictory results.  The 
audit states that only $500.5 million of the $1.015 billion provided by USAID has gone to 
farmers that desire to switch to a licit crop.  One of the difficulties in promoting 
alternative development lies in how the money is applied to the different communities.  A 
                                                 
50 USAID - Office of Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Colombia’s Alternative Development 
Program, Mar. 12, 2010, 6. 
51 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 67. 
52 Congressional Research Service, Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative Development in the Andes, 
7–8. 
53 USAID, Assessment of The Implementation of The United States Government’s Support for Plan 
Colombia’s Illicit Crop Reduction Components, Vanda Felbab-Brown et al., Apr 17, 2009, 8.  
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACN233.pdf. 
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grouping of farms can receive funding only if they first remove all coca plants.  If one 
farmer in the community maintains a small plot of coca then the entire community is cut-
off from alternative development funding.  The USAID audit summarized the difficulties 
of applying alternative development by stating, “Communities that benefit from the 
greatest improvements in security and are least dependent on coca cultivation for 
economic survival eradicate coca to qualify for GOC and USAID assistance whereas 
communities that face the greatest insecurity and largest economic obstacles to 
abandoning coca are left without assistance.”54  Table 5 lists the funding provided to each 
department from MIDAS and ADAM projects, and each area’s corresponding coca 
cultivation data based upon the USAID audit.  The results shown in Table 5 are not 
promising.  Certain departments that received a significant amount of USAID funding 
experienced large increases in coca cultivation (Cauca) while other departments that 





















Table 5. Departmental List of Alternative Development Funds Versus Coca 
Cultivated (From USAID, Assessment of The Implementation of The United States 













Total Value of 
ADAM and  
MIDAS  
Projects in  
U.S. Dollars 
Amazonas 692 836 21 6,042,000 
Antioquia 6,157 6,096 -1 24,347,000 
Arauca 1,306 447 -66 0 
Bolívar 2,382 5,847 145 13,650,000 
Boyacá 441 197 -55 1,167,000 
Caldas 461 187 -59 791,000 
Caquetá 4,967 4,303 -13 31,000 
Cauca 2,104 5,422 158 41,752,000 
Cesar 0 5   5,735,000 
Chocó 816 2,794 242 1,541,000 
Córdoba 1,216 1,710 41 10,756,000 
Cundinamarca 120 12 -90 15,414,000 
Guainía 753 625 -17 0 
Guaviare 9,477 6,629 -30 0 
La Guajira 166 160 -4 0 
Magdalena 271 391 44 1,124,000 
Meta 11,063 5,525 -50 0 
N. de 
 Santander 
488 2,886 491 3,462,000 
Nariño 15,606 19,612 26 30,496,000 
Putumayo 12,254 9,658 -21 23,991,000 
Santander 866 1,791 107 22,988,000 
Valle del 
 Cauca 
281 2,089 643 1,691,000 
Vaupes 460 557 21 0 







Alternative development strategies focused largely on the replacement of illicit 
crops with coffee, oil palm, cut-flowers, cocoa, and sugar.  These crops were selected 
because of their market potential (both domestic and international), as well as the optimal 
soil and climate conditions found throughout the coca cultivating areas of the country.  
The following analyzes the impact of oil palm and coffee because they received the most 
alternative development funding and were correspondingly applied in departments that 
had a history of extensive coca cultivation. 
 Coffee is Colombia’s leading agricultural export.  In the late 1980s, coffee 
exports represented 51% of Colombia’s exports.  This resulted in Colombia’s acute 
sensitivity to price fluctuations in the coffee market.  Today, coffee remains an important 
crop with the “livelihoods of an estimated 566,000 families, some 2.3 million 
Colombians, depending entirely on coffee.”55  Several million people were negatively 
impacted when international prices of coffee dropped to record lows in 1999–2003.  This 
drop offers a potential explanation for the sudden increase in coca cultivation in 1999.  
Farmers switched to a more lucrative crop during the coffee price drop.  Since 2002, the  
Colombian government has made strides to prevent such an economic shock from 
happening again. In 2002 the National Federation of Coffee Growers (Fedecafé) 
commenced several reforms including,  
commercialization and output-purchase guarantees; stabilization of coffee 
growers’ income; and advancement of coffee institutions by funding 
R&D, improving the coffee growers’ managerial skills, safeguarding 




By 2006, the Colombian economy had diversified into oil, services, and 
manufacturing exports; leaving coffee at less than 6% of total exports today.  Table 6 
illustrates annual average coffee export prices and the decrease that occurred in 2001.  
                                                 
55 U.S. Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Colombia—A Country Study, ed. Rex A. 
Hudson, (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, 2010), 6. 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pdf/CS_Colombia.pdf.  








 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
US  
cents/lb 
132.40 101.67 85.05 61.91 60.37 64.05 80.09 114.33 113.97 123.25 138.12 141.60 194.37 273.21 
 














Figure 3 graphs the fluctuation in coca cultivation versus coffee bean prices.  
Fedcafe’s reforms, paired with eradication efforts and alternative development programs 
promoted the legitimate farming of coffee instead of coca.  Indeed, many of the 
alternative development funds went toward promoting coffee as an alternative source of 
income for impoverished farming families.  By 2010, with planning and financial support 
provided by ADAM, 30,910 hectares were converted from coca to coffee57. 
 
Figure 3.  Coffee Prices Versus the Amount of Cultivated Coca 
Oil palm has also been a focus area for alternative development projects.  It is 
primarily grown in the departments of Meta, César, Santander, Nariño, Magdalena, and 
Norte de Santander.  As a result of increased planting and added efficiency measures, 
Colombia’s palm oil yield increased three-fold between 1990 to 2006; placing it among 
the top five palm oil producing nations in the world.  With support from alternative 
development programs the area of oil palm cultivation has grown to 452435 hectares.58  
Requiring approximately one worker per eight hectares, the palm oil industry employs 
                                                 
57 USAID—ADAM Quarterly Performance and Monitoring Report 2010 - 17th Quarter: January –
March 2010, May 5, 2010, 5. 
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over 130,000 Colombians.59  The transition from illicit crops to oil palm is a lengthy 
process, with oil palm trees typically not producing harvestable material until two to four 
years after initial planting.60 However, palm oil has proven to be the most successful of 
alternative development crops due to its diverse uses including food, lotions, medications, 
and biofuel.  It is further supported by the GOC’s 2007 implementation of bio-diesel 
mixing requirements which mandate that all diesels be blended with a 15% mixture of 
palm oil.61  In 2011, it was reported that more than 70,000 hectares of coca were replaced 
with oil palm.62  Strong domestic demand cushions the palm oil harvesters from 
significant international market fluctuations in palm oil commodity prices and provides 
much needed stability for former coca farmers and field hands.   
E. DEPARTMENTAL ANALYSIS 
A closer evaluation of specific administrative departments (regions) in Colombia 
demonstrates which areas experienced the greatest fluctuations in the amount of coca 
cultivated.  Analyzing this data provides insights into the most influential causal factors 
(eradication, security, or alternative development) involved in the overall coca cultivation 
reduction from 2000 to 2011.  Of the 33 departments in Colombia, 23 are known to have 
coca fields.  Table 7 lists the 23 departments and their corresponding coca cultivation 
area (in hectares) by year.  The highlighted rows, Caquetá, Guaviare, Putumayo, Norte de 
Santander, and Nariño experienced the greatest fluctuation (in total quantity) over the 
period studied.  In the early stages of the program, these departments accounted for over 
80% of the coca cultivated in the country.  This table shows an overall decline in coca 
cultivation from 1999 levels in most of the 23 departments. 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 11; Khoo Khee Ming and D Chandramohan, “Malaysian Palm Oil Industry at Crossroads and 
Its Future Direction,” http://palmoilis.mpob.gov.my/publications/opiejv2n2-10.pdf  
60 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “The Oil Palm,” 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/T0309E/T0309E01.htm  
61 Nathanial Gronewold, “Biofuels Push Becomes Weapon in Colombia’s War on Narco-Traffickers,” 




Table 7. Coca Cultivation Changes by Department 


























532 784 625 783 897 692 541 836 312 338 
Antioquia* 3,644 2,547 3,171 3,030 4,273 5,168 6,414 6,157 9,926 6,096 5,096 5,350 
Arauca 
 
978 2,749 2,214 539 1,552 1,883 1,306 2,116 447 430 247 
Bolivar 5,897 5,960 4,824 2,735 4,470 3,402 3,670 2,382 5,632 5,847 5,346 3,324 
Boyacá 
 
322 245 118 594 359 342 441 79 197 204 105 
Caldas 
    
54 358 189 461 56 187 186 46 
Caquetá 23,71
8 
26,603 14,516 8,412 7,230 6,500 4,988 4,967 6,318 4,303 3,985 2,578 





453 323 1,025 816 1,080 2,794 1,789 3,158 
Cordoba 1,920 117 652 385 838 1,536 3,136 1,216 1,858 1,710 3,113 3,889 
Cundinamarca 
 
66 22 57 57 71 56 120 131 12 0 32 
Guainía 
 
853 1,318 749 726 721 752 753 623 625 606 446 
Guaviare* 28,43
5 
17,619 25,553 27,381 16,163 9,769 8,658 9,477 9,299 6,629 8,660 5,701 
La Guajira* 
 
321 385 354 275 556 329 166 87 160 182 134 
Magdalena 521 200 480 644 484 706 213 271 278 391 169 121 
Meta 11,38
4 
11,123 11,425 9,222 12,814 18,740 17,305 11,063 10,386 5,525 4,469 3,008 





6,280 9,145 8,041 4,471 3,055 844 488 1,946 2,886 3,037 1,889 
Putumayo* 58,29
7 
66,022 47,120 13,725 7,559 4,386 8,963 12,254 14,813 9,658 5,633 4,785 
Santander 
 
2,826 415 463 632 1,124 981 866 1,325 1,791 1,066 673 
Valle del  
Cauca  
76 184 111 37 45 28 281 453 2,089 997 665 
Vaupes 1,014 1,493 1,918 1,485 1,157 1,084 671 460 307 557 395 721 
Vichada* 
 
4,935 9,166 4,910 3,818 4,692 7,826 5,523 7,218 3,174 3,228 2,743 
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1. Guaviare 
Guaviare is located in the Southeastern portion of Colombia.  The terrain is 
considered Amazonia or tropical rainforest.  This department had little economic activity 
until coca cultivation abruptly expanded during the 1980s.63  By the 1990s, Guaviare was 
the largest coca cultivating department.  Later in the decade, much of the illicit 
cultivation had moved to nearby Putumayo although Guaviare remained a stronghold of 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) members. Population density in 
the Amazon basin (including Guaviare, Putumayo, and Caquetá) is 0.24 inhabitants per 
square kilometer.64  Guaviare represented 27% of the total coca cultivated in 2001.65  By 
2002 it decreased to 19% of the national total.  The sizeable reduction in coca cultivation 
from 2002 to 2004 is largely attributed to the massive increase in aerial eradication.  In 
2004 President Alvaro Uribe initiated Plan Patriota, using a recently quadrupled military 
force largely funded by U.S. assistance dollars under Plan Colombia.  Plan Patriota 
pushed a large military force into the FARC stronghold in the South and Southeast of 
Colombia.  The military intervention lasted until 2006 when it was replaced by Plan 
Consolidación.  Areas of newly restored security experienced a sustained drop in coca 
cultivation as a result of the military’s continued engagement in the region. Neither 
MIDAS nor ADAM programs intervened in Guaviare.  Figure 4 illustrates how aerial 
eradication initially decreased cultivation quantities in 2003.  The military intervention in 
2004 sustained the initial drop in cultivation as aerial eradication efforts decreased.  A 
decline in cartel and leftist guerillas resulted in a smaller customer base for coca farmers.  
Many coca farmers moved west, further into ungoverned areas near the Ecuador border.  
Alternative development funding data from FFWP is incomplete but the available data 
indicates that it was not a large recipient of funds from this program either.  Thus, the 
significant reduction of cultivated coca in Guaviare is largely a result of aerial eradication 
                                                 
63 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 24; Roberto 
Steiner and Hernán Vallejo, “Agriculture,” in Colombia: A Country Study, ed. Rex A. Hudson 
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 2010), 77.  
64 Steiner and Vallejo, Colombia: A Country Study, 77, 345. 
65 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2002 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 13. 
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and enhanced security/interdiction.  Guaviare coca plantations are smaller and more 
dispersed due to the military presence, but cocaine production continues to take place in 
small facilities throughout the department.  Today the GOC considers Guaviare 
“strategically important, not only for coca cultivation, but also as crossing point for both 
drug trafficking and arms smuggling, as well as for storage of coca base production 
before export outside the country, due to its vicinity to Venezuela and Brazil.”66   
 
Figure 4.  Guaviare Cultivation and Eradication Chart 
2. Caquetá 
Caquetá borders Guaviare in the South-central portion of Colombia, near the 
Ecuador border.  The western edge is primarily Andean highland, while the central and 
eastern portions of the department are rain forest.  Coca is cultivated almost exclusively 
in the Andean highlands.67 There are very few improved surface roads.  Several 
alternative development programs were initiated in Caquetá in 2002.68  Caquetá received 
approximately $31,000 from the MIDAS and ADAM programs, the lowest among 
departments that received aid for the programs.  FFWP funds involved several thousand 
                                                 
66 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 77.  
67 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 12. 
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families; however the program participation greatly decreased by 2010.  Due to the 
minimal funding from MIDAS and ADAM and the subsequent decline in FFWP 
participation, alternative development programs in Caquetá had no measurable impact.  
As in Guaviare, the significant reduction of cultivated coca is largely a result of aerial 
eradication and enhanced security.  A large increase in fumigation beginning in 2001, 
followed by the sustained military presence brought about through Plan Patriota in 2004 
have made it very difficult for coca farmers to continue their illicit activities.  
Additionally, the support provided by cartels and guerillas is greatly diminished because 
of the enhanced security. 
 
Figure 5.  Caquetá Cultivation and Eradication Chart 
3. Putumayo 
Putumayo is located on the southern edge of Colombia, bordering both Ecuador 
and Peru.  The eastern half of Putumayo is Amazonia while the western half is Andean 
highland.  Putumayo’s population is 341,513 which represent roughly 0.8% of 
Colombia’s total population.69  In 1999, Putumayo contained 58,297 hectares of coca, by 
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far the largest among all 33 departments.  In 2000, coca fields in the department 
expanded to 66,022 hectares, representing 40% of the total coca fields in Colombia.  
Since 2000, Putumayo has experienced a steady decline in the amount of coca cultivated.  
In 2011, the UNODC reported that Putumayo’s coca cultivation had partially rebounded 
to 9,951 hectares.70 
As in the two previous departments Putumayo’s coca reduction is largely 
attributed to an aggressive aerial eradication campaign, followed by an equally aggressive 
military presence under Plan Patriota and Plan Consolidación.  These actions by the GOC 
have forced guerilla groups and coca farmers into nearby Nariño, which is considerably 
more remote with very little government presence.71  Figure 6 illustrates a drastic 
increase in aerial eradication beginning in 2001, followed by the military presence in 
2004, which corresponds with increased cocaine and derivative seizures thereafter.  A 
2008 assessment of Plan Colombia noted that alternative development strategies have 
been slow to reach Putumayo.  Families that relied on coca for their livelihood either 
migrated west into Nariño or planted coca seeds in smaller, more remote areas of the 
department.72  While Putumayo continues to receive more alternative development funds 
than most neighboring departments, the implementation of projects and funding Nariño is 
seen as too slow to continue the coca reduction momentum created by the aggressive 
aerial eradication campaign.  Most alternative development projects take several years 
before they can begin earning revenue for the targeted population.  This overall delay in 
alternative development explains the fleeting effect of aerial eradication as coca numbers 
increased 108% in Putumayo from 2010 to 2011. 
                                                 
70 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 10. 
71 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2002 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 24; 
Colombia: A Country Study, 345. 
72 Beatriz Acevedo, Dave Bewley-Taylor, and Coletta Youngers, “Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An 
Analytic Assessment,” The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008, 10. 
 35 
 
Figure 6.  Putumayo Cultivation, Interdiction, and Eradication Chart 
4. Nariño 
Nariño is located in the southwestern edge of Colombia, bordering the Pacific 
Ocean and Ecuador.  The western edge is considered Pacific lowlands, consisting of 
jungle and swamps.  The eastern edge is part of the Cordillera Occidental Andean Range 
with rugged mountainous terrain.  Population density is approximately five inhabitants 
per square kilometer.73  Aside from a few small cities, the department is primarily rural.  
The Pacific Lowland area offers few roads and little if any state presence.74  More than 
90% of the coca cultivated in Nariño occurs in the Pacific region. 
                                                 
73 Steiner and Vallejo, Colombia: A Country Study, 72. 
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Figure 7.  Nariño Cultivation and Eradication Chart 
Figure 7 illustrates that Nariño experienced a 400% increase in coca cultivated 
from 1999-2010 in spite of significant increases in aerial spraying.  The aerial eradication 
campaign in Nariño was ineffective in large part because of the high level of reseeding in 
plots that were previously eradicated.75 Coca cultivating families were driven to replant 
when they found few alternative development programs to support them.   Additionally, 
Nariño remains a terrorist haven for the FARC and other armed groups that were driven 
out of Putumayo and Guaviare departments as a result of Plan Patriota.76  Armed groups 
actively support coca cultivation in Nariño with their densest concentration of coca 
cultivation found along the Ecuadorian border.  Additionally, aerial eradication efforts in 
Nariño are stymied by the tenuous relationship between the Ecuadorian government and 
the Colombian government.  Ecuador blames Colombia for accidentally spraying large 
portions of the border area and destroying legitimate crops.  Because of the proximity to 
the border, Nariño is not able to spray as effectively as it could in other areas.   
Several alternative development programs have been initiated in Nariño since 
1998.  These programs have spent over $52 million, but have failed to produce any long-
                                                 
75 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 110. 
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term reductions in coca cultivation.77 Alternative development strategies are primarily 
hindered by a lack of infrastructure and the overall insecurity of the region that has little 
government presence.78  Many of the new coca plantations in Nariño were created by 
former inhabitants of Putumayo, Guaviare, Caquetá, and other departments seeking 
refuge from persistent aerial eradication and an enhanced security environment that is 
unfriendly toward coca farmers.  A USAID funded analysis of Nariño’s counternarcotic 
strategies found that the marked increase in cultivated coca from Nariño over the past 
decade is attributed to “an unstable state presence and persisting insecurity, inadequate 
transport infrastructure, lack of legal livelihood alternatives, including high costs of doing 
business, and social and geographical isolation.”79  Workers from the three largest 
alternative development programs are unable to access the southern portions of the 
department due to instability and violence.  Unlike Guaviare, Putumayo, and Caquetá, 
Plan Patriota and Plan Consolidación did not extend into the Southwestern portion of the 
country. Legitimate farming activities are unable to succeed with an overall lack of 
security.   Nariño remains the largest coca cultivating department in Colombia today.   
5. Norte de Santander 
Norte de Santander borders Venezuela on the northeastern edge of Colombia.  It 
is considered Andean highland with a year-round moderate climate, ideal for cultivating 
numerous types of crops.80  In 1999, Norte de Santander ranked fourth highest among the 
coca cultivating departments in Colombia.  Up until 2005, the FARC maintained a large 
presence in the department with little to no government security intervention or 
investment.  Since 2005, the Colombian military has drastically reduced the FARC 
presence, driving them eastward into Venezuela.  Under Plan Consolidación, the military 
continues to provide security for the department with an ongoing presence spread among 
                                                 
77 USAID, Assessment of Plan Colombia, 96. 
78 Ibid., 93. 
79 Ibid., 87. 
80 Colombia—A Country Study, 73–75. 
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the predominantly rural population centers.81  At the start of Plan Colombia Norte de 
Santander was among the top departments undergoing aerial eradication.  By 2004 both 
manual and aerial eradication dropped significantly.  This drop in eradication coincides 
with an increase in alternative development funding as well as an increase in security 
provided by a persistent military presence.82  By 2010, Norte de Santander was the 
largest recipient department of alternative development funds, receiving over $7 million 
between 2005 and 2010.83  USAID heavily promoted the planting of coffee, oil palm, 
cocoa, and sugar in the northeast due to its excellent growing conditions.  Figure 8 
illustrates a decrease in coca cultivation that coincides with an increase in the commodity 
price of coffee.  Another significant factor that effected coca cultivation in Norte de 
Santander was the GOC mandate for 10% bio-diesel mixture in all domestically 
consumed diesel fuel.  Thus, the significant reduction of cultivated coca in Norte de 
Santander is largely a result of the combined efforts from eradication, enhanced security, 
extensive alternative development, and economic conditions that favored more profitable 
substitutes to coca.   
                                                 
81 Nathanial Gronewold, “Biofuels Push Becomes Weapon in Colombia’s War on Narco-Traffickers,” 
New York Times, May 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/02/02greenwire-biofuels-push-
becomes-weapon-in-colombias-war-94778.html?pagewanted=all. 
82 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2005 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 25. 
83 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008 Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 64; United 




Figure 8.  Norte de Santander Cultivation, Eradication, and Alternative Development Chart 
6. Cauca 
Cauca lies along the Pacific coast in the Southwestern corner of Colombia.  It 
borders Nariño in the South, Valle de Cauca in the North, and the Central Cordillera 
Mountain Range along its eastern edge.  It is primarily rural with approximately 
1,345,000 inhabitants.84  In 2007, the GOC began large annual increases in their aerial 
and manual eradication efforts within Cauca.  These activities were not matched with a 
corresponding decline in illicit crop cultivation.  Instead, crop monitoring agencies noted 
a greater dispersion among coca fields within the department.  Numerous small coca plots 
continue to proliferate in order to minimize the impact of aerial fumigation.  Cauca was 
one of the earliest recipients of U.S. funded alternative development money.85  From 
2005 to 2010 Cauca received USD$41,752,000, which is 27% more than any other 
department in the nation.  Despite all of the alternative development initiatives Cauca 
experienced minimal fluctuations (both increases and decreases) in the quantity of coca 
                                                 
84 “Inhabitant: Caucano,” accessed February 8, 2013, http://www.colombia-
sa.com/departamentos/cauca/cauca-in.html.  
85 Congressional Research Service, Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Related Funding Programs: 
FY2006 Assistance (RL33253: Jan. 27, 2006), Connie Veillette, 6, accessed on Aug. 24, 2012, 
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cultivated within its borders  from 2001 to 2010.  However, drastic declines in most of 
the other departments have slowly elevated Cauca to the second highest coca cultivating 
department in the nation.  Today, Cauca remains the second largest cultivating 
department, second only to its southern neighbor Nariño.  The persistence of coca and 
opium poppy cultivation in Cauca is mostly attributed to a large FARC and ELN 
presence.  
In 2010 and 2011, the military launched a new round of offensives in Cauca.  
Military operations were designed to disrupt the longstanding occupation of FARC forces 
within the department.  The military succeeded in killing Alfonso Cano, the leader of the 
FARC, in November 2011.  Although the FARC were dealt a series of defeats, their 
stronghold remained due to the limited government presence after operations were 
completed.86  Unlike Plan Patriota and Plan Consolidación, which sought to establish a 
long term military/governmental presence, the recent military offensives in South Cauca 
seek a short term objective and then withdraw back to military headquarters outside the 
city of Popayán.  This strategy only momentarily disrupts the illicit activities of leftist 
guerillas and cartels that operate in the rural areas of department and does little to 
influence the agricultural community of Cauca to adopt the licit crop farming practices 
that were emphasized by alternative development programs.87   
                                                 
86 Sarah Maslin Nir and Simon Romero, “Leader of FARC Guerrilla Movement Is Killed in Combat, 
Colombian Officials Say,” New York Times, November 5, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/world/americas/leader-of-farc-guerrilla-movement-is-killed-in-
combat-colombian-officials-say.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1360276844-n+LCbfPDBSq6Irh2H//7Ew.  
87 Jim Glade, “Drug, Guerrilla Violence Is Crippling Colombia’s Southwestern Cauca Department,” 
New York Times, April 11, 2011, http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/15526-drug-guerrilla-
violence-is-crippling-cauca.html.   
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Figure 9.  Cauca Cultivation and Eradication Chart 
7. Departmental Analysis Conclusion 
The coca cultivation results from Caquetá, Guaviare, Norte de Santander, 
Putumayo, Cauca, and Nariño are attributed to different factors; however, security issues 
demonstrate the largest deciding factor in whether the department experienced an 
increase or reduction in illicit crop cultivation. After analysis of the economic and 
security initiatives conducted in Colombia it appears unlikely that alternative 
development alone is responsible for sustained illicit drug cultivation reductions.  Instead, 
it appears that the programs are mutually dependent on each other for success. The data 
and interviews with farmers support the use of security/interdiction as the primary reason 
for the overall reduction in coca cultivation during the period studied.  When the military 
presence increased the coca farmers no longer had an outlet with whom to sell their coca 
leaves.  Departments with little government presence such as Nariño maintain high coca 
cultivation numbers because the alternative development is not enough to curb the 
influence of leftist guerillas and cartels. 
Developed areas such as Norte de Santander show that alternative development 
only works when executed in conjunction with significant eradication and interdiction 










1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011







are initiated.  Cooperation on security initiatives between U.S. and GOC agencies 
modernized security and justice systems and allowed for the implementation of 
alternative development programs in many previously hostile rural areas.88  Impoverished 
families require a source of income to survive.  When eradication/interdiction removes 
their source of revenue they are encouraged to adopt licit crop farming.  Persistent 
eradication and interdiction raises the risk of being a coca farmer, often leaving a farmer 
with months of work and nothing to show for it.  Alternative development incentives 
serve as an inducer to legitimize farming activities.  However, when eradication is not 
complemented by alternative development programs, farmers tend to move to an area not 
impacted by eradication and continue growing coca.89  Data from the largest coca 
cultivating departments demonstrates the “balloon effect” whereby one department 
squeezes out coca cultivation, it expands into another department.90  This effect continues 
to push elicit crop planting into the more remote and less-governed areas of Colombia 
where yields shrink but the threat of eradication and interdiction are greatly diminished.  
Until such time as the GOC can effectively secure its entire population the coca problem 
will persist.  USAID alternative development projects were not meant to stand alone.  
They must accompany the disciplinary-styled security measures enacted by the GOC 
with support from DEA and DoD programs.   
                                                 
88 USAID, Assessment of The Implementation of The United States Government’s Support for Plan 
Colombia’s Illicit Crop Reduction Components, Vanda Felbab-Brown et al., Apr 17, 2009, iii. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACN233.pdf. 
89 Ibid., 8. 
90 Wayne Bazant, a former UNODC analyst, is credited as the first person to utilize the balloon effect 
analogy when describing drug production trends in 1987.   
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III. CONCLUSION 
The primary objective of Plan Colombia was to reduce the supply of cocaine 
going into the U.S.  Due to several factors outside of Colombia, cocaine levels in the U.S. 
remained stable throughout the period analyzed.  The government expected to see a price 
increase as a result of the decreased cocaine availability from counter narcotic initiatives 
in Colombia.  Instead, the 2012 White House report on drug use found that cocaine and 
derivative prices in the U.S. have experienced an overall decline since their peak in 
previous decade.91  During the same period, purity of the cocaine has increased.  One 
factor explaining this price reduction is the increased production of cocaine in Peru and 
Bolivia.92  The White House report also indicates a decreased demand for cocaine within 
the U.S.93  Thus traditional indicators of supply fluctuations through quantity limitations 
have not been a reliable benchmark as the Reuter and Kleinman article eluded.  This 
continued availability of cocaine throughout the 2000 to 2011 period provides further 
credibility to the balloon effect theory. 
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The U.S. greatly benefited from the like-minded policies promoted through 
Colombia’s war on drugs.  Similar approaches by the U.S. in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru 
have not come close to achieving the desired results.  As indicated earlier, future policies 
seeking broad economic and security objectives in a foreign nation should only be 
pursued when the recipient nation’s desired end state neatly aligns with that of the U.S.  
Additionally, the methods of pursuing those objectives must also align.  The major 
disparity between U.S. and GOC counternarcotic policy involved the prioritization of 
combatting leftist guerilla groups ahead of illicit crop destruction.  When developing the 
objectives for Plan Colombia, the U.S. failed to stress the counter-insurgency component 
                                                 
91 White House,  What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (Washington, DC: White House, 
2012), 59. 
92 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2012, 36. 
93 White House, Drug Availability Estimates in the United States (Washington, DC: White House, 
2012), 35–36. 
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of the assistance package.  Politicians were led to believe that eradication, interdiction, 
and alternative development would remedy the widespread illicit crop farming in 
Colombia.  As the U.S. program in Colombia progressed, extensive support to military 
efforts were required to achieve the desired results.  The costly eradication program failed 
to produce long term reductions in the area of illicit crop cultivation.  Similar unilateral 
attempts at alternative development produced meager results.  The foreign assistance 
funds that were applied to long term military expansion proved to be the most effective 
starting point for reducing the prevalence of illegal activity (both illicit crops and leftist 
guerilla groups).  These results coincide with the arguments presented by Hoffman and 
Morrison-Taw. 
Since inception, Plan Colombia and the ongoing Andean Counterdrug Initiative 
have succeeded in reducing the amount of coca cultivated in Colombia.  The question for 
policy makers is: Are the results from Plan Colombia significant enough to warrant 
continued foreign assistance funding?  Policy makers should strongly consider the 
minimal impact that Plan Colombia had on the availability of cocaine in the U.S.  If 
funding is to continue then policy makers should closely monitor the application of aid 
funding.  As this case study demonstrated, the application of a single component, 
security, eradication, or alternative development, is rarely enough to turn the population 
away from illicit crop farming.  When the GOC and U.S. partnered to apply both long 
term security and eradication operations the rural population responded by either 
adopting legal crops or migrating to a less governed area.  The subsequent use of 
alternative development funds was a critical factor in the process of assisting farmers 
who desired to adopt legal crops.  Financial and infrastructure support allowed the 
farmers to support their families and provided access to markets for their new crops.   
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